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Abstract 
Macedonia's economy was not left behind by the global economic crisis as the 
country's macroeconomic policymakers had hoped! Certainly, an economy open at 
all and with a high degree of direct dependence on European and global economies 
in general should not be saved by the crisis in financial top and then the global 
economic. Transmission of negative effects but came a little late economic shocks 
in the periphery are often stronger than the epicenter. In these circumstances 
macroeconomic policymakers should be more proactive, coherent and dynamic 
design of the following measures and economic policies increasingly based on 
relevant research and analysis (decision making based on research and analysis). 
Therefore, this analysis aims to develop and study in detail the measures in terms of 
economy, Science and Technology of Macedonia in order to suggest a more 
effective policy in accordance with business cycles, always comparing the 
economic measures in other states with which the country has advanced reports on 
economic but referring to specific local economic conditions. Accordingly the 
specific activities recommended for further action. 
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1 Time distance of economical projections as a basis for economic 
measures, mainly during the global economic crisis – case study 
on the Republic of Macedonia 
The World economic crisis – identified at the beginning as a financial crisis, about 
which there are different opinions for the time when they arose, not only that it still 
exists but according to numerous economic scientists and analysts it will exist 
longer that it was preliminary estimated. Due to this, we consider that there is a 
necessity of more fundamental analysis and studies of the designed governmental 
anti-crisis measures with particular emphasis on the Republic of Macedonia, having 
in mind the specifics of a small and rather open (liberal) economy. 
“A big crisis is threatening the country. During the following months and years the 
United States of America will come up against the biggest flop in their economic 
history – one strike from the oil, one rapid fall of the consumer’s confidence and at 
the end a big recession. Owners of houses under mortgage, owners of the last 
insurance policies and at the end the financial system, will collapse. Those events 
can mutilate big and protected funds, investment banks and the other mega 
financial institutions such as Faniie Mae and Freddie Mac” 2 These were words of 
the world renown economist Nouriel Roubini stated on 7th of September 2006 in 
front of an Assembly of economists and representatives of International Monetary 
Fond -IMF that were sceptical at the beginning and laughed on the estimations that 
Rubini gave. Perhaps, “they were right “when they laughed because at that time in 
the USA, unemployment and inflation were at low levels – within the frames of the 
anticipated and the economic growth was at a sustainable rate apart from the 
increase of oil prices and flexibility on the market of mortgage loans. 
Afterwards many economic analysts identified the first signs of the occurrence of 
the financial crisis in the USA since the first half of 2007, many economic 
researches, that are becoming more evident these days, state that real causes and 
factors that caused the crisis, are from the past. The BBC publisher Hugh Pym and 
the economic analyst of Financial Times and Observer Nick Kochan, in their 
economic review of the financial crisis,3 in “investigation” of the crisis’ roots 
among other state ,,... in 1992 the USA Congress passed the laws with which it was 
asked from the government “to get back” (stimulate) providers of the mortgages 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to develop more sub-primary crediting in 
order Americans with the low income to be priority of the market ,....,,( end of 
                                                 
2 Mihm, S. (2006, September 7). Dr. Doom. The New York Times. Retrieved December 25, 2009, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/magazine/17pessimist-t.html 
3 Pym, H. and Kochan, N. (2008) What Happened? London: Old Street Publishing, p. 6. . 
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quote). Since then, rightly, the Nobel Prize winner for economy Joseph Stieglitz 
says that “the crisis is exported from USA to the whole world”.  
Western Europe and above all Great Britain at the beginning of 2008, started 
seriously to “reshape” its current economic politics and the same was followed by 
many other countries from South-East Europe - SEE. 
How did the other governments in the region react? In October 2008, the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia made revised estimations for 2009, inter alia 
about the projected growth of GDP from 6,5%, on the basis of which projection it 
projected its fiscal policy (Budget), but it was not a month – in November they 
realized that the crisis will have a full swing in their economy, they changed the 
growth rate for 3,5% and proportionally the projected fiscal policy – Budget for 
20094. Similar projections also had the other countries in the region.  
The data in Table.1 illustrates the revised rates of growth of the world and regional 
economies5: 
Table 1: Rates of growth as % of the change of GDP 
 
 Realization 
2007 
Estimation 
2008 
Projection 
2009 
World economy 5,0 3,7 2,2 
Developed countries 2,6 1,4 -0,3 
   USA 2,0 1,4 -0,7 
   EU 3,1 1,5 -0,2 
   Japan 2,1 0,5 -0,2 
Countries in development 8,0 6,6 5,1 
   China 11,9 9,7 8,5 
   Russia 8,1 6,8 3,5 
Central and Eastern Europe 5,7 4,2 2,5 
   Serbia 7,1 6,0 3,5 
   Croatia 5,6 3,5 3,0 
   Bulgaria 6,2 6,5 4,5 
R. Macedonia 5,1 5,3 5,5 
Source: IMF, WORLD ECONONIC OUTLOOK, NOVEMBER 2008 
The analysis of the first quarter of this year shows larger decrease in comparison of 
some optimistic economic projections. These analysis show a decrease of the 
growth of the World economy for 3, 2% whereas projections of the whole 2009 
show decrease of the global economic activity from -0, 5% to -1% whereas its 
revival is expected to be during 2010 6. 
                                                 
4 See: Memorandum of Budget and Economical Fiscal Policy for 2009 with Projections for 2010 and 
2011. 
5 Data for Regional Economies (including RM) - Economic Commission - Economic Projections, 
November 2008, Brussels. 
6 National Bank of Republic of Macedonia. (April 2009). Macroeconomic researches: Quarterly Report. 
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In the most developed world economies a bigger decrease of GDP during 2009 (-
3,3%) is expected, whereas in the economies with the high intensity of growth is 
estimated an “aggressive” decrease of intensity and projections calculate a growth 
only 2%, as a result of non-functioning of the financial global system7, as it is 
shown graphically below: 
 Figure 1: Real GDP Growth in advanced industrialized Economies 
(annual percentage change; quarterly data) 
 
Source: NATIONAL BANK OF REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, APRIL 2009 
IMF Projections during 2009 have changed depending on the current trends of the 
world economy and in the last projections they are more optimistic since some 
developed economies in the last months show signs of revival. In the last edition of 
IMF for Europe8 the negative economic growth for R. Macedonia from 2, 5% is 
projected whereas for 2010 the positive growth of GDP is 2%. The following 
graphic copies the projections of the global economy separated in groups of the 
countries as follows: 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 IMF Regional Economic Outlook-World Economic and Financial Surveys, Europe Securing Recovery, 
October 2009. Retrieved September 21, 2009, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/EUR/eng/ereo1009.htm 
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Figure 2: Global GDP Growth (Percent, quarter-over-quarter, annualized) 
 
Source: IMF STAFF ESTIMATES, 2009 
The data above (in the previous table) show that R. Macedonia not only that 
entered with its macroeconomic projections in 2009 with “irrational enthusiasm”, 
(Alan Greenspan) but “existed” too long on them not wanting to recognize the 
reality of the impact of the global economic crisis that was evident by the “outward 
observers” of the states during the first quarter of the year.  
The Macedonian Ministry of Finance through the Macroeconomic Policy 
Department , in November 2008 prepared and submitted to the competent 
Commissions of the Assembly of R. Macedonia, information9 of the effects on the 
global financial crisis on the Macedonian financial system and on the real economy 
in order to undertake appropriate measures for over-passing the eventual 
unfavourable states towards the Macedonian economy in which the basic 
parameters for expansive fiscal planning in 2009 were posed without taking into 
account the real economic power of the country after the influence of the crisis on 
the real sector of economy.  
During November 2008, the Analysis of the Draft Budget for 2009 was done and 
the presentation and debate was organized with all interested parties from the prism 
of central budget where all “irrational expectations” of the budget projections were 
categorically and explicitly pointed out , by the incomes and expenditures, 
specifically in the coming election months of the year. The time quickly certified 
the analysis of experts against fiscal governmental “enthusiasts”10. At the beginning 
of 2009 from the Foundation –Memorial Center Nikola Kljusev a round table 
debate was organised. The topic of the debate was “Republic of Macedonia and the 
World Economic Crisis” and on that debate the ambitious fiscal projections of the 
Government were pointed and high fiscal risk of the Government that will shortly 
have consequences. A few months later the states were certified to a high extent of 
                                                 
9 Ministry of Finance – Macroeconomic Policy Department, Information of the effects of the global 
financial crisis on the Macedonian financial system and on the real economy, November 2009 Skopje 
10 Bexheti, A. (2008).Functional analysys of the Draft –Budget for 2009, Skopje: FOSIM. 
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preciseness of the pointed projections given by the experts (above 200 million 
Euros higher projections, out of which 175 million Euros were corrected at the first 
rebalance of the budget).11 
Apart from the domestic expert, public and other relevant institutions pointed on 
time that the projections were too ambitious as it is stated also in the Report for the 
country (Republic of Macedonia)12 about the doubtfulness of these projections that 
can lead to delusion at the economic agents in the country. The IMF and European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) at the projections of the 
country for 2009 were even more sceptical in comparison to the stated report. In the 
regular Report of IMF for the country13 the risk of the “growing budget deficit” is 
implicitly pointed, that it can generate additional macroeconomic pressures” in the 
country. 
Beside this, in Republic of Macedonia, after two years when “developed countries” 
have turned on their alarms for the coming of the biggest crisis after the Great 
Economic Depression from the thirties, competent institutions wanted to show this 
situation as “a comparative advantage” and “chance” for attracting all investments 
that would run from the developed and will be directed to the less developed and 
“unavailable” markets for crisis, among which is the R. Macedonia. Several months 
later it was seen that this naivety and illusion would not last because the first 
consequences of the crisis were evident at the end of 2008. Certain authors interpret 
this tendency as a consequence of “the advantage of the economic backwardness” 
of the country.14 Beside this and apart from all suggestions that were given by the 
numerous economic experts, competent institutions in the light of their irrational 
optimism “designed and brought” Draft-Budget and Macroeconomic Projections. 
The intensity of the worsening of the state of the Macedonian economy (and some 
other economies in the region) was very high and forced authorities to “recognize” 
the reality and to redraw “cocktail measures” with which they will oppose the crisis 
that seriously metastasized great number of branches of Macedonian economy. 
Hence there is a great need and necessity for deeper analysis of the current state 
and applied measures for alleviation of the state and commencement of the 
“economic revival”. 
The lesson of this retrospective suggests that there is a need of timely and real 
projections of the state – especially during the global crisis that was evident for 
                                                 
11 Foundation – Memorial Center “Nikola Kljusev”. (2009) “Republic of Macedonia and the World 
Economic Crisis”. Skopje: p. 38-42,. 
12 Country Report Macedonia, Economic Intelligence Unit. (2008) London, pg.7.  
13 IMF Country Report No.09/XX, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Selected Issues, pg. 11 
February 2009 
14 See: Shukarov, М. (2009).World Economic Crisis and Challenges for the Macedonian Economy. 
Skopje.  
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more than a year. It is better to recognize the truth even though it is unfavourable, 
than to hope that it will not attack us. Usually the global crisis attacks at the 
periphery of the strike where it is the strongest and it is difficult to do the 
reparation.  
2 Cohesion and synergy of economic policy and the function of the 
balance of markets and economic cycles  
Generally, economies are not linear phenomena. In the middle and on the long term 
national economies are cyclic, the same as business cycles of every economic 
entity. In the long term the economies are growing but in the interims they note 
growth and decrease i.e. the permanent fluctuation of the economic activity of 
every national economy is noted. Economic theory recognizes and identifies 
different phases in the economic cycles but the most significant are two main 
phases-the lowest (recession phase-through) and the highest (expansion phase-
peak).15 Even in the latest book of professor Fiti16 the newest theoretical 
achievements of the economic science for business cycles until nowadays are 
elaborated on a complex and fundamental way.  
Proportionally to economic cycles, appropriate anti cyclical economic measures 
should be designed that will influence the alleviation and shortening of the period 
for decrease of national economy on one side and fastening and maintaining of the 
growth on the other side. This is fundamental objective of every national economy 
that can be realized with the optimal combination of different economic measures.  
In the last two decades Macedonian economy notices typical cyclic development – 
with significant decreases in the initial years of transition (until 1995 it had 
negative growth) and on 1996 notices positive mild increase with the “record” of 
4,6% in 2000 and in the following year this percentage “to melt” in the same 
negative rate of growth (-4,5% as a result of the war conflict in 2001). The rates of 
growth of Macedonian economy and countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
last decade are shown in the following table: 
                                                 
15 See: Fiti, Т. (2008). Economy, Skopje: Faculty of Economics, p .329. 
16 Fiti, Т. “Phenomenology of Economic Crisis”, UKIM, Skopje 2009 
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Table 2: Rates of growth in Macedonian and countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009** 
% of real GDP (RM) 4,5 -4,5 0,9 2,8 4,1 4,1 4,0 5,9 4,9 -0,6 
Average (CEE) -- -- -- -- -- 6,0 6,6 5,4 2,9 -3,7*** 
Source: MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF RM, 2009 AND IMF-WORD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 2009 
*ESTIMATED DATA 
**LAST PROJECTION-AUGUST 2009, AND 
***TAKEN FROM IMF (APRIL 2009) 
The average economic growth of Macedonian economy for two decades (1988-
2007) is not significant (about 1, 2%- according to some data in 1985 GDP per 
capita in R.M was 2.210 $ whereas the same in 2007 was only 2.646 $ or have 
grown only for 20%17) and represents the lowest rate in the region after Kosovo, 
since Monte Negro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were on a better position. The 
reasons are complex and there is not enough space to elaborate them here. The aim 
is to focus on the cohesion of the economic measures against global economic 
crisis with special emphasis on their analysis in the case of Macedonian economy.  
In the period when the economic policies for 2009 were projected, current 
economic indicators pointed out the seriousness of the impact of the global 
financial crisis toward the real sector of the Macedonian economy (above all in 
industry). In the fourth quarter of the year, in relation to the previous, GDP 
decreased almost three fold (from about 6% in the previous three quarters to 2% in 
the last quarter). This was a sufficient signal that Macedonian economy and all 
other economies will be seriously challenged, above all as a result of decrease of 
exports and investments. 
                                                 
17 www.australianmacedonianweekly.com/edition 
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Figure 3: Indices of Industrial Production m/m-12 
 
Source: SSO, JANUARY 2009 
According to one qualitative study18 made with companies in the “Polog” region, 
during November 2008 the economic state is estimated as unfavourable in 
comparison to the previous period. The usage of capacities of respondent 
companies in November 2008 in relation to the third quarter is decreased for 60,2% 
as a result of the decreased external demand (decreased export) for 13,1% and 
internal demand for 17,4%. 
One year period has passed since we entered in the process of negative economic 
growth (from October 2008) and until today we didn’t succeed in synergic and 
cohesive manner to coordinate the basic economic policies in the country - fiscal 
with monetary. Whereas the government from the beginning is positioned in the 
paradigm of the expansive fiscal policy in order to “compensate”19 part of the 
demand of goods and services of Macedonian companies in export. Through the 
projected budget deficit from 2,8% from GDP the Government was determined to 
incite the public consumption, above all through the public investments in the 
sphere of construction. This position challenged monetary policy (in the case of 
                                                 
18 Damishia, B. (2009). “Global Financial Crisis and Macedonian Economy”, Tetovo (te specifikohet nese 
eshte liber ose artikull) 
19 See: Stavrevski, Z. (2009). “RM and the World Economic Crisis”. Skopje. p.17  
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National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia) to take care for the stability of prices 
(low inflation) in order to preserve macroeconomic stability of the country. Two 
competent institutions for the most vital economic policies (fiscal and monetary) 
did not succeed to be coordinated but on contrary with its current policies were 
diametrically contrary positioned in that prices of the causal-consecutive behavior 
that generate negative effects from that non-coordination.   
No matter “who has started this matter first”, in this discrepant behavior the deficit 
of the institutional capacity for creation of functional market economy is copied as 
a basic precondition for stable and sustainable economic growth. At the first 
dispute for the Draft Budget of RM at the Assembly Commission for economic 
issues several conclusions were brought that were submitted to the Government of 
RM, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and NBRM, in which among other 
things point 5 states: “ The commission considers that it is necessary NBRM to 
continue with measures that have been undertaken until now, but also to undertake 
activities for decreasing interest rates of the bank loans, for enterprises that are 
using loans for investments , and also to decrease interest rates of commercial 
banks of the already approved loans”20. From this point the situation can be clearly 
copied in which the most vital institutions for the economic policies in the country 
“are in a difficult spot”. 
The positions went even “further” than “ bickering” from one side to another went 
to the extent that communication for ,,harmonization“ of the economic measures 
are realized in the distance of several thousands kilometers – from Washington 
(where it was participated in the regular assemblies of IMF and SB), “the 
government communicated” with NBRM.  
The trend of increased deficit of the paid balance of the country forced NBRM 
“tighten“ even more the monetary policy through the basic rate of interest and 
increase of the compulsory reserves of the commercial banks. When basic rate of 
interest of NBRM reached 7% commercial loans were placed with the average rates 
of interest from 9-9,5%. In the conditions of significantly decreased incomes in the 
central budget, the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Government of Republic of 
Macedonia announced the selling of state bonds on the “record” annual rate from 
9% that forced NBRM to react with increase of the basic rate of interest of the 
treasury bills from 7% to 9,1%.This ”overrun” was “very strong” and forced the 
government to stop with “the continuing competition” in this process but this 
enormously increased rates of interest of the loan negotiations toward economy (in 
average from 11-13%) and with higher dynamism of negotiations for consumer 
                                                 
20 Assembly of RM, Commission for Economic Issues nr. 20-5036/2, Conclusions 5, 19 November 2008 
Skopje. 
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loans of citizens (in average from 13-15%). It lead to decrease of the consumption 
(negative trend from -0,5%) and investments (negative trend from -20,8%) in the 
country in relation to the same period last year, that apart from the export are main 
factors that determine the economic growth of Macedonian economy. 21 
This unambiguously leads to the statement that non-coordinated economic policies 
which are result of the shortage of institutional capacity of the institutions and a 
shortage of the management capacity of cohesion as a precondition for synergetic 
economic measures could hinder already hard economic states that were incited as 
an impact of the global economic crisis. Today, when the world is giving 
tremendous efforts (G-20 in London and Pittsburgh) in a global economy to 
coordinate and harmonize economic policies of the most powerful economies 
through national governments of those countries, in order to alleviate negative 
effects in the free movement of capital and other resources we should not even 
mention the need of a big coordination of the economic measures within a national 
economy.  
3 Analysis and critical review of the anti-crisis measures in the 
Republic of Macedonia  
Beside the fact that in developed market economies the crisis started in the 
financial sector in the middle of 2007, a long time ago some concerned institutions 
announced it, above all “Financial Sector Assessment Program”22 warned financial 
sectors of separate countries “to take care of the high level of lending, above all for 
bad clients”. Basic reason for its appearance is seen in the underperformance of 
three most important pillars of financial markets –Regulatory, Supervisory and 
Rating Agencies. As consequences today the G-20 takes care for consolidation of 
these institutions. In the last recently made relevant economic analysis it is said that 
“the consumers’ confidence is the lowest in the last 40 years”. 23  
Having in mind that the financial market in R. Macedonia and of the regional 
countries are not sufficiently developed and are not significantly functioning  with 
secondary financial instruments, the financial crisis did not directly affect this 
sector but through the decline of real economy this sector is indirectly challenged.  
Taking cognizance of the structure of Macedonian economy and its dependence 
from the absorption of the foreign markets of our products on a relative low level of 
competition of our products against tendency of decreased stock prices for basic 
                                                 
21 SIS- National Accounts, GDP – Announcement. nr. 3.1.9.05 from 18.09.2009, Skopje.  
22 FSAP-Financial Sector Assesment Program among others work under the program seeks to identify the 
strengths and vulnerabilities of country’s financial system.  
23 www.ft.com/econforum 
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products, global economic crisis attacked real sector the most. In the last quarter of 
2008 the first signals of the negative impact of the global economic crisis were felt. 
For this reason during November 2008, the Government brought the “package of 
anti-crisis measures” 24-composed of ten measures in financial (nominal) value of 
about 20 billion MKD. These measures are explicitly given in this program: 
1) Law on writing off interest due liabilities on grounds of taxes and contributions 
for mandatory insurance social short procedure was adopted 
With this Law, all due liabilities of companies on basis of medical insurance along 
with the interests matured till 31.12.2008 are wrote off in the following 4 years , 
until 31.12.2012 and in this period the interest is not calculated. If in this four year 
period, companies and insured regularly pay the current obligations, the main debt 
and interest that remained are completely written off after the expiry on 
31.12.2012. 
The aim of this measure is to alleviate work conditions of the insured, i.e. 
employers that have accrued obligations and interests on the basis of medical 
insurance and to start with the regular servicing of the current obligations.  
The expected effect 25 of this measure is not only “buying time” by the “bad” tax 
payers for four years and then to follow the writing off (and “economically old-
fashioned”) demands. 
2) The Law on writing off of interest due liabilities on grounds of taxes and 
contributions for mandatory insurance social short procedure 
This Law anticipates writing off of all calculated unpaid interests on the grounds of 
public taxes that are due to 31.12.2008. All companies- tax payers that have unpaid 
interests on the grounds of personal tax on income, tax on profit, VAT, Tax on 
estate and contributions for retirement insurance, have the possibility to realize 
their right of writing off the interests under condition to pay the main debt. 
Unless they pay the main debt until 30th of April 2009, the interest will be 
completely written off 100%. If the main debt is going to be paid in the period from 
1st of May until 31 of August, the interest will be written off in amount of 75%, and 
with the payment of the main debt in the period from 1st of September till 31st of 
December the interest will be written off in amount of 50%. 
The expected effect of this measure will be neglecting and prolongation of the 
current obligations because of the partial paying of the “deposited” obligations in 
                                                 
24 There is no official announcement of “this package” except from internal governmental documents that 
the author comes up with after many efforts. 
25 The expected effects are author’s estimations – above all on the basis of empirical experience with 
similar measures in the past and knowledge of the culture and mentality of thinkikng of tax payers on the 
grounds of public taxes.  
14 Abdylmenaf Bexheti  
order to realize the given privilege – writing off the obligations on the grounds of 
interest.26. 
The representative of the Government 27 in a scientific debate on the occasion of 
“the successfulness” of this measure stated: ,,Regarding the fact that there were 
different experts’ opinions related (alluding on us) I would like to announce an 
information. Today ended the application period for companies for payment of the 
due capital on the condition to write them off the interests and we have 2.807 
requests - companies! The total amount of demands of the state on this ground is 
165 million Euros as a capital and 60 million Euros interest. The assumption is that 
all those that submitted a request will do this and the capital of 165 million Euros 
will be charged but the interest of 60 million Euros will be written off”.  
The effects of these measures, announced in September 2009 by the competent 
state organ (Public Revenue Office- PRO) were as follows28: 
- Cumulatively, after the first and second period (from 01.01.-31.08.2009) is paid 
the amount (main debt and secondary public taxes) in amount of 926.477.728,50 
denars ( or about 15 million Euros) after the performed writing off of the interest in 
the amount of 728.206.015,00 denars ( or about 12 million Euros). It is obvious that 
the results of this measure are far below projections by the competent – policy 
makers.  
3) Law on amending the Law on Tax procedure 
This Law enables the reprogramming of tax liabilities. All companies that have 
burdens in their operations, in order not to distract their operation will be enabled to 
pay on installments, at the most 36 installments. In order to get reprogram the 
enterprises must secure bank warranty in amount of 100% from the debt or 
mortgage in amount  of 250% from the debt. 
Measures 1 and 2 and partially 3 after definition are anti-reform ones - because in 
continuity of the former philosophy of similar measures was done before and the 
same provoked a motive to neglecting of the current obligations and not paying 
them – at least on the long term. Instead of motivation of regularity, neglecting for 
payment of current public taxes is “rewarded”. This should be a lesson not to repeat 
similar measures in future and to create equal ambience for all economic subjects in 
the state as a basic precondition for functional market economy.  
4) Law on amending the Law on paid circulation  
                                                 
26 The author made tis estimation at the public debate on 04.02.2009 organized by the Foundation –
Memorial Center “Nikola Kljusev”.  
27 Stavrevski. ibid. p. 18.  
28 Written report from PRO- announced on 11.09.2009 on the web page of the institution. 
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Last year the Law on paid circulation was brought in which prohibition for 
payment of companies that have blocked transaction accounts was predicted, that 
should be applied from January 2009. But regarding the hinder conditions for 
operations of companies incited by the state of the economy in the world, the 
Government brought the decision to postpone the application of this prohibition for 
one year. 
With this measure another transition period is given to the companies to adjust its 
operation with the Law on paid circulation.29 
5) Law – making demand of the Republic of Macedonia on the basis of public duty 
in a permanent stake in the companies OHIS, EMO, Tobacco Factory Prilep and 
Euro composites. 
It is about companies that have enormous arrears accumulated several years ago 
and worsened liquidity. Considering that the State has majority participation in the 
management of these companies, and mainly liabilities are towards state 
institutions, before accessing to selling of the state’s shares in that companies, the 
Government decided to turn requirements on the basis of taxes, contributions and 
other taxes in a permanent stakes.  
With this decision the states in these companies will be rehabilitated and at the 
same time they will become attractive for selling to the interested investors that will 
continue their business activity. The objective of this measure is to attract strategic 
investors in these companies for permanent solution of their problems.30 
Measures 4 and 5 have charterer of postponement and deposition of problems 
rather than solutions. The option to “nationalize” part of the capital of non-profit 
enterprises (former unremunerative companies) and then to expect attracting 
strategic investors for them is absolutely unreal and non-market oriented. If the 
measures are economical then they should deal with the process of liquidation or 
rehabilitation on the market if they want to be consistent in that. 
6) Taxation of profits only when it is allocated in dividend, following the example 
of Estonian model 
7) Reducing of customs, with amendments to the Customs tariff rate 
8) Two years prolongation of the payment of tax on interest of savings 
9) Lower rates of individual farmers 
Farmers who have annual income less than 300.000 denars (5.000 Euros) will be 
fully exempt from tax and those who have income between 300.000 and 1.300.000 
will be reduced income tax for 80%. In other words, the farmer that has income 
                                                 
29 These are estimations of the policy makers- i.е. measures 
30 Ibid  
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from 5.000 Euros will be tax exempt, and the farmers that have income of 20.000 
Euros will pay income tax of 400 Euros. 
10) Cancelling the costs for the New Year holidays 
In direction of reduction of non-productive outcomes, all state institutions, funds, 
agencies, public enterprises and stock companies with the decision of the 
Government this year will give up the funds for teams, gifts associated with the 
New Year holidays. The remaining measures (6 to 10) do not have any significant 
influence on the economic behavior of the subjects because the economic effects of 
these measures are limited. 
Consequently, due to the extremely limited economic effect of the already stated 
measures and due to the aggravating state during the period of time , the 
Macedonian Government in March 2009 passed “the other anti-crisis package of 
measures” called investment program of the Government of RM for the realization 
of strategic projects for the period 2009-2016, which includes various infrastructure 
projects in 8 districts and the summary is about 8 billion for a period of 8 years 
(2009-2016)31, and that is: 
- Energy with over 30 strategic energy projects (mines, power plants, hydroelectric, 
gas plants, nuclear program, patch, wind, etc...) In summary, 3.8 billion Euros will 
be provided from the Budget of RM and its own funds from state energy companies 
and MEPSO ELEM (400 million) of credit debt (800 million) and concessions and 
public-private partnerships (2.6 billion); 
- Transport infrastructure (road and rail), in a value of 3.8 billion Euros. In the road 
infrastructure the construction and rehabilitation of over 950 km. roads is planned 
and the summary of that is 2.6 billion Euros and rail infrastructure in a value of 1.2 
billion Euros. The funds are envisaged to be provided from the budget of the 
Republic (600 million) of credit debt (800 million), investment-concessions (2.4 
billion) and grants (27 million);  
- Water supply and sanitation (water supply and communal infrastructure) for over 
300,000 people in over 400 settlements totaling 100 million Euros of which 70 
million Euros for water supply systems and 30 million for drainage systems. The 
funds are envisaged to be implemented by the multilateral creditors, including 50 
million Euros from European Investment Bank, 20 million Euros from the World 
bank and 8,8 million Euros from KFW, and the remaining from other financial 
institutions. , 
                                                 
31 www.vlada.mk, Author’s researches and comments.  
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- Environment-the dominance of two major projects (Dojran lake and cascading 
walls of the Vardar River) in total financial value of 37.9 million Euros will be 
provided from the Budget of RM (7.4 million Euros) and the credit debt (30.5 
million Euros);  
- Construction of social housing over 1100 in summary 34 million Euros will be 
provided from the Budget of RM in the period 2009-2012;  
- Construction of sports facilities in summary over 100 million Euros will be 
provided from the Budget of Republic of Macedonia and 
- Education and culture- building a new University of Informatics and Technology 
in Ohrid (value -8 mil.euros) , construction of new student dormitory Aerodrom –
Skopje (worth 5mil. Euros) construction of two secondary schools in Struga (in 
amount of 7 mil.euros) all funded from the Budget of the Republic and the 
construction of 93 schools throughout the Republic financed by the Public 
Investment Program -PIP model.  
The second package of anti-crisis measures looks like list of wishes and is similar 
to the previous PIP in RM (PIP)32 rather than real program with really made studies 
and detection of real sources for their financing. Beside the fact that in R. 
Macedonia for five years formally is practiced “Medium-Term Budgeting 
Framework-MTBF”33 only small number of countries in development and 
transition succeeded functional practicing of this fiscal instrument. Perhaps in a 
case of shortage of optimal institutional capacity, an easier alternative of “mid-term 
budget framework” for “R. Macedonia it represents preparation for multiyear 
estimation only for investments and more significant outcomes” it is said in the 
Report of IMF for the country in February 2009”34. This kind of long-term 
investment programme is not sustainable without detailed implementation of the 
Cost Benefit Analysis Methods for a single project and on the grounds of those 
studies to make a selection of priorities for the capital projects. 
In this mega-investment program dominate the sources of funding for concessions 
(two - thirds or more than 5 billion Euros) for which doesn’t give the hope that it 
will happen neither current empire nor qualitative changes occurred in this 
circumstances (political, economic, integration, social, etc.). to hope that in the near 
                                                 
32 Author’s estimations. From 1996 in the Republic of Macedonia the so-called т.н. ,,PIP-Public 
Investment Program, is systemized , and was not realized even once for more than one –quarter – 
regardless whether it is by the financial value or by the physical capacity of the investments. Separate 
projects, as it is for example the energetic transmission line “Vrutok-Bureli” even after 15 years the 
investment was not realized – and the investment doesn’t cost more than 15 million euro! 
33 OECD & Ministria e financave pranë Qeverisë së R.Shqipërisë. (2004). Menaxhimi i shpenzimeve 
publike., Tiranë, p. 157. 
34 IMF Country Report No.09/XX. (2009). FYROM: Selected Issues, Washington: IMF, p. 14.  
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future it will really happen. A strong argument for this can serve prolonging the 
investment by the Turkish company, TAV two times one after another, through 
concessions PEAS Airports in Skopje and the multiple nullification and repetition 
of tenders for the concession of hydroelectric power stations (Cebren, Galishte, 
Boshkov Bridge……etc) in Macedonia only because of lack of interest by strategic 
investors. What has been changed or will be changed in the near future for this 
miracle happen? 
On the other side, other significant projected sources represent borrowing public 
debt (about 1.73 billion Euros) and budget funding (about 1,16 billion Euros)35 - 
both sources represent fiscal component in conditions of limited fiscal space in R. 
Macedonia 
In conditions of economic crisis and significant fiscal underperformance ( above 
25%) lower level of realized incomes for the period from 01.01-30.09.2009 in 
relation to the same period previous year) the possibility for fiscal expansion is 
limited with “duplication” of public debt for the following 8 years or with annual 
increase of above 150 million Euros of capital investments from the Budget of RM, 
apart from the regularly –planned public investments that are not realized more 
than 70% on the level of annually planned36. The volume and structure of public 
incomes neither structure of public outcomes at the current state not to allow this 
kind of expansive fiscal policy, at least on a long term.  
The economic cycles of Macedonian economy need cyclic “regulatory fiscal 
equilibrium”, where: 
 
FB*=PI* - PO* 
 
Where: 
FB*- Cyclic regulated fiscal balance  
PI*- Cyclic regulated public incomes and 
PO*- Cyclic regulated public outcomes  
 
                                                 
35 Calculations by the author - according to the Investment program of the Government of RM- for the 
period 2009-2016 
36 Bexheti, A. et. al. “The Analysys of the Potential for Good Management in R. Macedonia“. Skopje: 
FOSIM. p. 91-97,  
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Public incomes and public outcomes should be regulated (projected) proportionally 
on the basis of the ratio of potential GDP (potential economy) and factual (actual) 
GDP that are determined by their flexibility, so as: 
 
PI*=АPI x (GDP*/GDP)α  and  PI*=APO x (GDP*/GDP)β 
 
АPI- Actual public incomes, 
АPO- Actual public outcomes, 
GDP *- Potential GDP 
GDP - Actual GDP 
α - flexibility of public incomes  
β - flexibility of public outcomes  
 
On the basis of estimations provided by IMF (made on the basis of “Hodrick-
Prescott Time Series Filtering Method”)37 for 2009 cyclic regulated fiscal balance 
for R. Macedonia is as follows: 
Table 3: Cyclic regulated fiscal balance for R. Macedonia 
Description 2008 2009 
Actual GDP (billion denars) 387,1 422,7 
Potential GDP (---------,---------) 384,2 420,8 
Difference (gap) of GDP (the percentage cyclical regulated GDP) 0,8 0,5 
Budget balance (% of GDP) -1,5 -3,0 
Cyclical regulated fiscal balance (% of GDP) -1,8 -3,2 
Source: IMF-REPORT FOR THE COUNTRY, IMF OFFICERS, P.12, 2009 
Cyclical behaviour of the fiscal balance of R. Macedonia, according to estimations 
of IMF shows that “a positive fiscal impulse represents one regulated cyclical 
contraction”38. Precisely 2009 show that fiscal impacts through automatic fiscal 
stabilizers had negative reflection on the potential GDP whereas forced 
discretionary fiscal policies did not succeed to reimburse that because they have 
crowded the business. According to the same methodology projections for 2010 on 
the basis of effects of these policies are more optimistic because it is expected that 
the cyclical behaviour of the fiscal balance will generate minimal but positive 
                                                 
37 Look at footnote 29 
38 See: IMF-Fiscal Policy Framework for Macedonia-Results from Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Balances, 
September 2009, Skopje. 
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effect on the potential GDP (+0,7% from discretionary fiscal policies and -0,3% 
from automatic stabilizers =+0,4%). 
4 Fiscal policies and Budget of the Republic of Macedonia in the 
recession period. 
The debates of the active economic policies are old dilemmas in the contemporary 
macroeconomy. In the contemporary macroeconomic science there are like-minded 
people that agree that basic macroeconomic policies can influence, above all, in a 
short term in the aggregate demand and height of GDP and in employment. 
Representatives of neoclassical economic school do not agree with this (Nobel 
Prize winner R. Lukas and like-mined people) and they think that economic 
policies are not efficient. They developed -”The Policy In effectiveness 
Proposition”39 and consider that the management with the aggregate demand is 
useless and they draw attention to the aggregate supply. Many other famous 
economists confess that there is expressed inefficiency in the economic policies and 
they recommend less active economic policies. But “the new Keynesian advocates” 
and previously “middle-of-the-road Keynesian advocates” are convinced that 
management with aggregate demand is important for the national economy.40 
The current economic crisis again confirmed the economic theories for the need of 
anti-cyclical management with aggregate demand and many countries, included the 
most developed ones (even the most liberal economies such as USA and Japan), 
area actively managing with the aggregate demand, above all through public capital 
investments in order to generate employment and greater economic activity. 
After escalation of the global economic crisis and bringing of the “fiscal package” 
by the US Congress and then followed with other developed economies ( G-8 
Summit) and the last “fiscal infusion” of the US President Obama that is in amount 
of “800 billions US Dollars plus 350 billions US dollars as financial warranties” 
according to Michael Grunwald, we are almost returning to the Keynesian 
economy41. 
President Obama will be the first democrat that does not comply with the standard 
and restrictive fiscal policies of “the Democratic Presidents” in the US from the 
period of President Truman (1947) till nowadays. President Regan (1983) brought 
                                                 
39 Lukas R. & Sargent T. (1981). “Rational Expectation and Economic Practic,, New York: George Allen 
and Unwin. p. 361. 
40 See: Blanchard O. & Cohen D. (2002) Macroeconomie,.Paris: Pearson Education; Gregory M. (2004) 
,,Principles of Economics,, third edition, Harvard University. 
41 Grunwald, M. (January 26, 2009), “How to Spent One Trillion Dollars,, Time, , Vol.173, No.4/2009 
retrieved on June 14, from http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1871769,00.html 
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an “extraordinary act for creation of working positions” that then was in amount of 
9 billion US dollars (today 19 billion dollars). After him the president “old” Bush 
continued with increase of public outcomes and public debt and in the full period of 
President Clinton the deficit is decreased –even in his second mandate , after four 
decades , USA for the first time entered the zone of budget surplus , and with that 
distinct decrease of public debt. At the beginning of 2009, the enormous growth of 
budget deficit from 8,3% from GDP continues and public debt of 81% from GDP.42 
The expansion of the capital public investments according to “the anti-crisis 
package of measures” of the administration of President Obama has an aim to 
create (or to preserve-save) around 3.675.000 jobs at more than 14 sectors headed 
by the construction Sector (with 678.000 jobs)43. 
Nowadays you can randomly find an economist that contests State “interventions” 
for stabilization after the global economic crisis, that originated from the financial 
sector but in the last instance the real sector suffers the consequences. But this kind 
of behaviour of the most developed economies of the world lead by the USA can 
not be an alibi for the governments of small and limited economies “to imitate” the 
so called Laws of large numbers! 
Recently, the issue of height and volume of public incomes in relation to the 
institutional capacity for “good management” is being imposed. Great number of 
studies in public finances lately state that: “once the public income will exceed 1/3 
from GDP every marginal growing unit of public consumption will follow with low 
rate of economic growth in the states with poor management but this relation  is 
not valid for the countries with good governance. High level of public incomes is 
risky when public institutions are weak”, says manager of the country at World 
Bank and co-publisher of the Report.44. He continues further: “Public money is 
little when they are properly spent; deficits can become bigger when high taxes for 
financing of these outcomes are collected. This distorts business and employee’s 
decisions”45   
Fiscal studies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia prove that with good 
management fiscal policies are inciters of the growth.  
“The biggest challenges of the bigger number of countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia exist at the increase of effectiveness and efficiency of the public 
consumption” states Director of the sector of World Bank and co-publisher of the 
                                                 
42 Congressional Budget Office-2009 Projected Figures (which do not include Obama’s American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Plan numbers). 
43 Romer, Ch. & Bermstein J. (2009). The Job Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan. 
http://otrans.3cdn.net/ee40602f9a7d8172b8_ozm6bt5oi.pdf  
44 World Bank, Release nr. 2007/463/ECA, Brussels, July 2, 2007. 
45 Look at footnote 3. 
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Report, Cheryl Gray46. Furthermore she continues “This is very important for 
fastening the growth and dynamism of development with conviction that 
population benefits from consumption in health, education, pensions and 
infrastructure”. 
Apart from the attitudes of these world relevant developmental institutions many 
researchers refer to their researches for “government’s effectiveness” in the public 
sector. Professor Adam Tőrők47 uses Robert Portes’s concept for governmental 
efficiency in which he states that “government efficiency is a more important 
criterion than size”48. He simultaneously actualizes the dilemma for “Social 
welfare” or “Consumer welfare”. 
Due to the expressed recession in the developed countries and decrease of industrial 
production in the first half from 2009 in the European countries in the average for 
about 20% - above all for the countries exporters of Macedonian products 
(Germany 19,3%, Italy 21,8%, Slovenia 22,3% etc.) and as a consequence the 
expressed negative rate of growth in these countries (Germany -7,1%, Slovenia -
8,5%, Italy -6,5%, Austria -4,7%, Croatia -6,7%, Turkey -13,8%)49 it was 
transferred on the effects of Macedonian export- above all industrial goods that 
influenced the overall economy and resulted in official recession of Macedonian 
economy for the first quarter -0,9% and the second quarter -1,4%.50 
During the first half of 2009 and beside the fact that the consequences of the 
economic crisis were already felt in R. Macedonia ( and beyond the fact that the 
recession was afterwards announced) there was not enough “critical mass” of the 
interested parties (like business community and media through professional and 
academic debates) that would influence the economic policy makers in order to 
design more rational and productive regulated anticyclical fiscal policies that will 
have different effect on the potential GDP. During June 2009, when the paid 
balance of the country reached the most critical level in the last decade, the 
Delegation of the Mission of IMF represented with the highest rank in the last 
decade stayed in the country – Director of IMF for Europe (former Prime Minister 
of Poland MR. MAREK BELKA) which made efforts to encourage the Government to 
made an arrangement with IMF. In comparison to us51 for the macroeconomic 
policies against economic crisis and the need for engagement with IMF, Mr. Marek 
                                                 
46 World Bank, Release nr. 2007/463/ECA, Brussels, July 2, 2007. 
47 Member of Hungarian Academy of Science and Member Fiscal Council of Hungarian. 
48 Presentation of A. Torok at 9-th EDS (European Doctoral Seminar), Budapest, September 2009  
49http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/Rebalans_na_Buxetot_na_RM_za_2009-
_za_na_Sobranie_02.09.2009.pdf  
50 www.stat.gov.mk Announcement 3.1.9.05 од 18.09.2009. 
51Meeting of delegation of IMF Mission with N. Popovski, A. Bexheti, J. Manasievski and M. Nikolov on 
12.06.2009 in Skopje 
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stated that “tomorrow may be too late for the IMF to change its relation with the 
country”. 
During the second quarter, the Government brought “third package of anticrisis 
measures” 52 that is consisted in the following areas: 
I. Budget rebalance of R. Macedonia,  
II. Measures for support of enterprises under the EIB credit and  
III. Other measures for support of enterprises. 
In the area of the Budget rebalance the following measures were taken: 
-Temporary ban on new employments in 2009 in public administration and public 
sector (except for employments in the Program EU NPAA in accordance to the 
obligations of the Framework Agreement); 
-to postpone 10% wage increase of employees in public administration and public 
sector (which was predicted for October 2009, deferred costs on this basis 531 
million denars); 
-reduction rate for current expenditures in all budget users on average about 16% 
(saving 3.6 billion denars)  
-prolongation of ban on procurement of furniture and equipment, vehicles and other 
unproductive expenditures of all budget users to 31.12.2009 
-to reduce the number of official trips and significantly reduce the number of 
members of delegations to travel abroad (except the minister, usually + two 
members from the ministry for more members, prior to informing the government);  
-with all budget users to reduce the cost of representation, advertising and 
sponsorships (which are not directly related to rendering of the planned and 
undertaken structural reforms);  
-rigorous control of fees and other costs (for mobile phones, travel abroad ... etc) to 
members of management and supervisory boards of public companies, agencies, 
funds and others, public organizations and institutions;  
-to prohibit payment of fees for commissions formed within the ministries, 
agencies, funds and other public organizations and institutions;  
-30 % reduction of the official cell phone expenditures for the public 
administration; 
-to authorize the heads of public institutions to reduce the cost of representation;  
                                                 
52 Extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of Government on April 21, 2009- “Item: Information on the 
Third Package of Anti-crisis Measures”, Skopje. 
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-to control employments through employment agencies for temporary employment;  
-to reduce the current and capital expenditures as well as bonuses to public 
companies, funds, agencies, institutions and stock companies in the dominant state 
ownership,  
-to recommend reducing of expenditures for local administration in terms of teams, 
trips abroad and so on; 
-to prolong part of the projects in the part of capital expenditures or to get new 
dynamics for their realization and payment;  
-to provide funds for engaging 5,000 unemployed persons to perform public works 
for a period of six months as a social measure in conditions of economic crises; 
All these measures over time were transformed into the rebalance of the budget for 
2009 (two rebalances for 3-4 months), which, “interpreted” in fiscal morphology 
mean reduction of total public revenue 14,756,000 thousand denars (240 million 
Euros) and a reduction of total public expenditure for 15,203,000 thousand denars 
(247million Euros) and coordination of budget deficit with slightly reduction for 
522,000 thousand denars (8.5 mil. Euros), which retained almost the same level - 
2.8% of GDP 
These fiscal measures are characterized with the following remarks: 
- In almost all of these measures there is an expressed form of relativization of the 
same, through different variations- systematic and spontaneous, that usually in a 
shortage of fiscal culture and fiscal discipline, exceptions are turned into the rules 
of behavior. In any of them ( some are on purpose underlined in brackets – as 
variation of the already announced announcements for employment, separate 
discretion rights of certain official to approve such abandons,...etc); 
-the biggest part of fiscal measures for fiscal “saving” were forced due to the 
significant underperformance of public incomes ( above all VAT and excise) and 
were not designed as anticyclical fiscal measures or “cyclical regulated budget 
balance” that would have positive impact on the economical cycle of Macedonian 
economy; 
-delayed fiscal measures – at great number of measures undertaken fiscal obligation 
already exists and is difficult to return the budget users, especially during the fiscal 
year , more restrictive fiscal position which will lead to “fiscal regulation” of 
timing of accounting expression of expenditures ( often in agreement with the 
lenders on the grounds of budgetary demand)53, 
                                                 
53 Bexheti, A. (2007). ,Financat Publike,. Tetovë: UEJL. p. 344 
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-reducing with greater intensity of the already insufficient (structural) 
developmental component of the budget – capital expenditures are reduced over 
18% ( almost double reduction in comparison to the total expenditures)54 something 
that is not recommended during the economic recession; 
-social funds above all Health Fund, in condition of expansion of range of free 
health services ( amendment of the Law on medical insurance expended the range 
of about 40.000 insurers to use medical services without reimbursement) and in 
direction of reducing the rates for contributions, they could generate additional 
fiscal pressure and “breaking through” the budget deficit;  and  
-usually “tightening the belt” in the post-election period and in the second half  was 
not proved to be real in the realization.  
In the area of measures for credit support of enterprises –private sector, the 
Government provided budget line from the EIB in amount of 100 million Euros, on 
which is expected to be added 50-100 million Euros from commercial banks as co-
financing of sustainable projects from the private sector.  
This financial program mainly refers to:  
-co-financing of credits for small and medium enterprises (to 250 employees) in 
amount of 50%; 
-subvention of rates of interests; 
-support of export; and  
-maintenance of the existing number of employees and stimulation of new 
employments 
For all stated purposes in the program the criteria and conditions are closely 
determined for sustainable projects on the basis of the projected aims of the 
program. 
In terms of continuous trend of increases of price of “financial capital” of internal 
capital market these measures would represent a good basis for stabilizing the price 
of money and incitement to return to the previous level (from a year ago). 
However, this program represents only the insufficient amount that would 
challenge the competition of the credit placements of domestic commercial banks 
in order to achieve the effect of reducing of interest margins of investment loans in 
the country. 
In the third area- measures for support of enterprises are encompassed:  
                                                 
54 www.finance.gov.mk Proposal for Amendment of Budget of R. Macedonia for 2009, p.10 
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-measures to simplify the custom operations as a second phase of the Project 
Regulatory Guillotine , 54 new measures are proposed to simplify the custom 
operations and speed up the flow of goods through the border ; 
-measures proposed by the Chambers of Commerce to regulate claims and 
liabilities between companies and state on all grounds (such as 10 measures of 
consultations with chambers of commerce), which meet all state administration 
bodies and are recommended for public companies and companies in the state 
ownership with majority state capital to pay its obligations no longer than 45 days; 
and  
-several measures of the transport sector to support carriers (proposed by 
Makamtrans Association of Independent trade Unions of Transporters) 55 
In the measures of the second area there are also responsibilities that are a-typical 
and, even with the decision of government require respect, of “the legal deadline 
for return of VAT, or, full realization of infrastructure projects envisaged budget 
for 2009”, as well as, “full payment of agricultural subsidies provided in the budget 
for 2009”. Legal obligations for repaying the VAT and implementation of the 
budget (which is also “Law “) with the decision of government can not be “incited” 
to be realized with the governmental decision – this only confirms endogenous and 
structural shortage of institutional capacity for realization and implementation of 
laws adopted by the higher authority of the government. 
5 Instead of “Fourth package of anti-crisis measures…” 
Recommendations to the economic policy makers in the Republic of Macedonia are 
the following: 
1. Permanently to follow the economic situation - with sustainable analysis – 
cohesively with coordination and synergy to bring measures on the basis of 
information , analysis and research of all relevant institutions (the 
Government, NBRM, State Institute of Statistics, etc.) and on the basis of 
projected sustainable objectives of the economic policy.  
2. Late reaction due to the political opportunity will harm political structures. 
This was proved with the current policies in 2009.   
3. Not to mix up the measures- there is difference between intervention 
measures and structural and reform measures. Supporting the enterprises to 
cope with the current obligations towards the State – instead of motivation of 
                                                 
55 See: Information for “Third Package Anti-Crisis measures” p. 3-11. 
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regularity the dereliction  for payment of taxes is “awarded”. All these in 
principle are antireform measures. 
4. The economic cycles of Macedonian economy need cyclical “regulated fiscal 
balance” explicitly based on the fiscal possibilities of the country. Mega 
investment program for realization of strategic projects “8 billions for 8 
years” is not in line with the fiscal space in R. Macedonia.  
5. In the shortage of capacity for implementation of “mid-term budget 
framework” at least to practice the multiyear estimation” only for 
investments and more significant expenditures”. Capital strategic 
investments can not be selected without consistent application of Cost and 
Benefit Analysis.  
6. Until the consolidation of economy – without exceptions of determination to 
“take off” from the budget all expenditures that are not productive for 
Macedonian economy and that can be postponed to “better times” and are 
exerting pressure on the paid balance of the country. There are still too many.  
7. To re-examine until is too late, without need the firm attitude “against the 
engagement with IMF”- we will dearly pay the loans from the commercial 
capital market. The industry is in need of at least three times more financial 
capital than the “EIB Program”. We will spend Eurobonds – what is next?
28 Abdylmenaf Bexheti  
References 
AMARTYA, S. (2002). Rationality and Freedom, Harvard University Press 
ADAM, T. (2009). , Fiscal Policy of Hungarian Government Against Financial 
Crisis, 9th EDS, Budapest.  
BARRO, R. & SALA, M. (1995). Economic Growth. McGraw-Hill, Inc.  
BEXHETI A. (2007). Financat Publike. Tetovë: UEJL.  
БЕЏЕТИ A. (2009). Функсионална анализа на предлог-буџетот за 2009 година, 
Скопје:  
БЕГ Д., ФИШЕР С. & ДОРНБУШ Р. (2001). ,Економија, Скопје: НИК . 
ДЕМИШАИ Б. ,, Глобалната финансиска криза и македонската економија,, март 
2009, Тетово 
GREGORY M. (2004) ,,Principles of Economics,, third edition, Harvard University. 
GRUNWALD, M. (January 26, 2009), “How to Spent One Trillion Dollars,, Time, , 
Vol.173, No.4/2009 retrieved on June 14, from 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1871769,00.html 
HARRIS E. (2008). ,,Ben Bernanke’s FED-The Federal Reserve After Greenspan,,. 
Harvard Business Press. 
HARVEY R. (2003). Public Finance Sixth Edition. Tirana: Albin. 
HEERTJE & WENZEL, ,,Grundlagen der Volkswirtchaftslehre,, 7 Auflage, Springer 
2008 
HUGH P. & KOCHAN N., (2008). What Happened. London: Old Street Publishing 
LTD. 
KRUGMAN P. (2008). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. 
Penguin Books. 
LUKAS R. & SARGENT T. (1981). “Rational Expectation and Economic Practic,, 
New York: George Allen and Unwin. p. 361. 
MIKESELL J. (2003). Fiscal Administration. Sixth Edition, Wadsworth.  
MUSGRAVE, R. A., 1973. Teorija javnih finansija. Beograd: Naučna knjiga. 
ROMER, CH. & BERMSTEIN J. (2009). The Job Impact of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Plan. 
http://otrans.3cdn.net/ee40602f9a7d8172b8_ozm6bt5oi.pdf  
Anti-Crisis Measures in the Republic of Macedonia and their Effects – Are they Sufficient? 29 
СТАВРЕСКИ З. ,,Р. Македонија и светска економска криза,, тркалезна маса, 
04.02.2009 Скопје 
STIGLITZ J. (2000). , Economics of the Public Sector. Third Edition, W. W. Norton 
& Company. 
ФИТИ, Т. ,(2008). Економија, Скопје: Ekonomski Fakultet. 
ФИТИ, Т. (2009). ,Феноменологија на економските кризи. Скопје: УКИМ.  
ШУКАРОВ, М.(Јune 2009). ,,Светска економска криза и предизвиците за 
македонската економија,,. Презентација за СГС: Скопје. 
Other sources: 
 Меморандум о буџету и економској фискалној политици за 2009 год. са 
проекцијама за 2010 и 2011 годину. 
Податоците за регионалните економии (вклучувајќи ја и РМ)-Економска 
Комисија-Економски проекции, Ноември 2008 Брисел. 
НБРМ, Макроекономски истражувања, квартален извештај, април 2009. 
Министерство за финансии-Сектор за макроеекономска политика, 
Информација за ефектите на глобалната финансиска криза врз 
македонскиот финансиски систем и врз реалната економија, 
Ноември 2009 Скопје 
Country Report Macedonia, Economic Intelligence Unit, pg.7 October 2008, 
London 
IMF Country Report No.09/XX, Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia: Selected 
Issues, pg.11 February 2009 
IMF Regional Economic Outlook-World Economic and Financial Surveys, Europe 
Securing Recovery, October 2009 
IMF-Fiscal Policy Framework for Macedonia-Results from Cyclical Behaviour of 
Fiscal Balances, September 2009, Skopje 
Фондација меморијален центар Никола Клусев, Тркалезна маса 
,,Р.Македонија и светска економска криза,,Фебруари 2009, Скопје. 
Собрание на РМ, Комисија за економски прашања бр.20-5036/2, Заклучоци, 
бр.5, 19 Ноември 2008 Скопје. 
ДЗС-Национални сметки, БДП-Соопштение бр.3.1.9.05 од 18.09.2009, Скопје 
30 Abdylmenaf Bexheti  
Писмен извештај од УЈП-објавен на 11.09.2009 во веб.страната на 
институцијата. 
OECD & Ministria e financave pranë Qeverisë së R.Shqipërisë-,,Menaxhimi i 
shpenzimeve publike,, fq. 157, Tiranë 2004. 
IMF Country report No.09/XX, FYROM: Selected Issues, pg.14, IMF Washington 
2009 
Congressional Budget Office-2009 Projected Figures (which do not include 
Obama’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan numbers). 
Извадок од Записникот на седницата на владата на ден 21.Април 2009-
,,Точка: Информација за трет пакет антикризни мерки,, 2009 Скопје 
World Bank, Release nr. 2007/463/ECA, Brussels, July 2, 2007. 
 
 
http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/Rebalans_na_Buxetot_na_RM_za_2009-
2_za_na_Sobranie_ 02.09.2009.pdf  
www.stat.gov.mk Соопштение број 3.1.9.05 од 18.09.2009. 
www.economist.com, New York Times, Magazine, August 15, 2008. 
www.finance.gov.mk Предлог за изменување и дополнување на Буџетот на 
Р.Македонија за 2009 година. 
www.australianmacedonianweekly.com/edition 
www.vlada.mk , Истражувања и Извекувања на авторот. 
www.ft.com/ecoforum 
BERG Working Paper Series on Government and Growth 
 
1 Mikko Puhakka and Jennifer P. Wissink, Multiple Equilibria and Coordination Failure 
in Cournot Competition, December 1993 
2 Matthias Wrede, Steuerhinterziehung und endogenes Wachstum, December 1993 
3 Mikko Puhakka, Borrowing Constraints and the Limits of Fiscal Policies, May 1994 
4 Gerhard Illing, Indexierung der Staatsschuld und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Zentralbank in 
einer Währungsunion, June 1994 
5 Bernd Hayo, Testing Wagner`s Law for Germany from 1960 to 1993, July 1994 
6 Peter Meister and Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Budgetfinanzierung in einem föderalen System, 
October 1994 
7 Bernd Hayo and Matthias Wrede, Fiscal Policy in a Keynesian Model of a Closed 
Monetary Union, October 1994 
8 Michael Betten, Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, and Matthias Wrede, Why Income Taxation 
Need Not Harm Growth, October 1994 
9 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Editor), Problems and Perspectives of the Transformation Process 
in Eastern Europe, August 1995 
10 Gerhard Illing, Arbeitslosigkeit aus Sicht der neuen Keynesianischen Makroökonomie, 
September 1995 
11 Matthias Wrede, Vertical and horizontal tax competition: Will uncoordinated Leviathans 
end up on the wrong side of the Laffer curve? December 1995 
12 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel and Bernd Hayo, Are the fiscal Flows of the European Union 
Budget explainable by Distributional Criteria? June 1996 
13 Natascha Kuhn, Finanzausgleich in Estland: Analyse der bestehenden Struktur und Ü-
berlegungen für eine Reform, June 1996 
14 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsperspektiven Turkmenistans, July 
1996 
15 Matthias Wrede, Öffentliche Verschuldung in einem föderalen Staat; Stabilität, vertikale 
Zuweisungen und Verschuldungsgrenzen, August 1996 
16 Matthias Wrede, Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures, December 1996 
17 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel and Bernd Hayo, Budget and Financial Planning in Germany, Feb-
ruary 1997 
18 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Turkmenistan: Die ökonomische Situation und Perspektiven wirt-
schaftlicher Entwicklung, February 1997 
19 Michael Nusser, Lohnstückkosten und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit: Eine kriti-
sche Würdigung, April 1997 
20 Matthias Wrede, The Competition and Federalism - The Underprovision of Local Public 
Goods, September 1997 
21 Matthias Wrede, Spillovers, Tax Competition, and Tax Earmarking, September 1997 
22 Manfred Dauses, Arsène Verny, Jiri Zemánek, Allgemeine Methodik der Rechtsanglei-
chung an das EU-Recht am Beispiel der Tschechischen Republik, September 1997 
23 Niklas Oldiges, Lohnt sich der Blick über den Atlantik? Neue Perspektiven für die aktu-
elle Reformdiskussion an deutschen Hochschulen, February 1998 
24 Matthias Wrede, Global Environmental Problems and Actions Taken by Coalitions, May 
1998 
25 Alfred Maußner, Außengeld in berechenbaren Konjunkturmodellen – Modellstrukturen 
und numerische Eigenschaften, June 1998 
26 Michael Nusser, The Implications of Innovations and Wage Structure Rigidity on Eco-
nomic Growth and Unemployment: A Schumpetrian Approach to Endogenous Growth 
Theory, October 1998 
27 Matthias Wrede, Pareto Efficiency of the Pay-as-you-go Pension System in a Three-
Period-OLG Modell, December 1998 
28 Michael Nusser, The Implications of Wage Structure Rigidity on Human Capital Accu-
mulation, Economic Growth and Unemployment: A Schumpeterian Approach to En-
dogenous Growth Theory, March 1999 
29 Volker Treier, Unemployment in Reforming Countries: Causes, Fiscal Impacts and the 
Success of Transformation, July 1999 
30 Matthias Wrede, A Note on Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work, July 1999 
31 Andreas Billmeier, The Early Years of Inflation Targeting – Review and Outlook –, Au-
gust 1999 
32 Jana Kremer, Arbeitslosigkeit und Steuerpolitik, August 1999 
33 Matthias Wrede, Mobility and Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work, September 1999 
34 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Herausgeber), Aktuelle Fragen der Finanzwissenschaft, February 
2000 
35 Michael Betten, Household Size and Household Utility in Intertemporal Choice, April 
2000 
36 Volker Treier, Steuerwettbewerb in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Eine Einschätzung anhand 
der Messung effektiver Grenzsteuersätze, April 2001 
37 Jörg Lackenbauer und Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Zum Stand von Transformations- und EU-
Beitrittsprozess in Mittel- und Osteuropa – eine komparative Analyse, May 2001 
38 Bernd Hayo und Matthias Wrede, Fiscal Equalisation: Principles and an Application to 
the European Union, December 2001 
39  Irena Dh. Bogdani, Public Expenditure Planning in Albania, August 2002 
40  Tineke Haensgen, Das Kyoto Protokoll: Eine ökonomische Analyse unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der flexiblen Mechanismen, August 2002 
41  Arben Malaj and Fatmir Mema, Strategic Privatisation, its Achievements and Chal-
lenges, Januar 2003 
42 Borbála Szüle 2003, Inside financial conglomerates, Effects in the Hungarian pension 
fund market, January 2003 
43 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel und Stefan Hopp (Herausgeber), Seminar Volume of the Second 
European Doctoral Seminar (EDS), February 2003 
44 Nicolas Henrik Schwarze, Ein Modell für Finanzkrisen bei Moral Hazard und Überin-
vestition, April 2003 
45 Holger Kächelein, Fiscal Competition on the Local Level – May commuting be a source 
of fiscal crises?, April 2003 
46 Sibylle Wagener, Fiskalischer Föderalismus – Theoretische Grundlagen und Studie Un-
garns, August 2003 
47 Stefan Hopp, J.-B. Say’s 1803 Treatise and the Coordination of Economic Activity, July 
2004 
48 Julia Bersch, AK-Modell mit Staatsverschuldung und fixer Defizitquote, July 2004 
49 Elke Thiel, European Integration of Albania: Economic Aspects, November 2004 
50 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Jörg Lackenbauer, and Klaus J. Brösamle, Public Debt and the 
Future of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, December 2004 
51 Holger Kächelein, Capital Tax Competition and Partial Cooperation: Welfare Enhancing 
or not? December 2004 
52 Kurt A. Hafner, Agglomeration, Migration and Tax Competition, January 2005 
53 Felix Stübben, Jörg Lackenbauer und Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Eine Dekade wirtschaftli-
cher Transformation in den Westbalkanstaaten: Ein Überblick, November 2005 
54 Arben Malaj, Fatmir Mema and Sybi Hida, Albania, Financial Management in the Edu-
cation System: Higher Education, December 2005 
55 Osmat Azzam, Sotiraq Dhamo and Tonin Kola, Introducing National Health Accounts 
in Albania, December 2005 
56  Michael Teig, Fiskalische Transparenz und ökonomische Entwicklung: Der Fall Bos-
nien-Hercegovina, März 2006 
57  Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Herausgeber), Der Kaspische Raum: Ausgewählte Themen zu 
Politik und Wirtschaft, Juli 2007 
58  Tonin Kola and Elida Liko, An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Exchange Rate 
Regimes in Medium Term in Albania, Januar 2008 
59  Felix Stübben, Europäische Energieversorgung: Status quo und Perspektiven, Juni 2008 
60  Holger Kächelein, Drini Imami and Endrit Lami, A new view into Political Business 
Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania, July 2008 
61  Frank Westerhoff, A simple agent-based financial market model: direct interactions and 
comparisons of trading profits, January 2009 
62  Roberto Dieci and Frank Westerhoff, A simple model of a speculative housing market, 
February 2009 
63  Carsten Eckel, International Trade and Retailing, April 2009 
64  Björn-Christopher Witte, Temporal information gaps and market efficiency: a dynamic 
behavioral analysis, April 2009 
65  Patrícia Miklós-Somogyi and László Balogh, The relationship between public balance 
and inflation in Europe (1999-2007), June 2009 
66  H.-Dieter Wenzel und Jürgen Jilke, Der Europäische Gerichtshof EuGH als Bremsklotz 
einer effizienten und koordinierten Unternehmensbesteuerung in Europa?, November 
2009 
67  György Jenei, A Post-accession Crisis? Political Developments and Public Sector Mod-
ernization in Hungary, December 2009 
68  Marji Lines and Frank Westerhoff, Effects of inflation expectations on macroeconomic 
dynamics: extrapolative versus regressive expectations, December 2009 
69  Stevan Gaber, Economic Implications from Deficit Finance, January 2010 
70  Abdulmenaf Bexheti, Anti-Crisis Measures in the Republic of Macedonia and their Ef-
fects – Are they Sufficient?, March 2010 
 
 
